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PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN ADMINISTRATIVE RULE
MAKING IN INDIANA
P. ALLAN DioNisoPOULoSt
The purpose of this study is to examine administrative rule making
in Indiana in light of criticisms of the reformers and against the back-
ground of Anglo-American ideas about certainty in the law and pro-
cedural due process. At the outset it should be noted that this study will
treat only a part of the whole body of administrative rule making. The
primary concern is with that sub-legislation which has a relatively obvious
effect on the rights and interests of private parties. However, for pur-
poses of examining Indiana's rule making history, it will be necessary to
consider and discuss certain administrative rules which are limited in
their application to a relatively few persons, e.g., students in public
schools or state universities; and to disregard that portion of administra-
tive rule making which is informal in character and is seldom brought to
the attention of the courts. While rules for the governance of school
systems might be discussed because of their pertinency to this study,
rules pertaining to the internal organization and procedure of administra-
tive agencies will be disregarded.
Some words of caution should be offered before any effort is
made to analyze the evolutionary development of administrative rule
making in Indiana. Rate making and licensing (including grants of fran-
chises or certificates of convenience and necessity) are functions which
could be, and were historically, exercised by legislatures within the Anglo-
American world. They might, therefore, be properly embraced within
the meaning of such terms as "rule making," "sub-legislative," or "quasi-
legislative." On occasion, as will be seen in certain of the cases discussed
herein, the Indiana courts regarded these as "ministerial" or "legislative"
in character. But only incidentally, and for purposes of illustrating certain
points, will there be discussions of these two functions. On other
occasions such words as "orders" and "decisions" will be used as though
they are synonomous with "rules" and "regulations." This is not, of
t Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin.
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course, a proper use of such words; however, this course seems necessary
to the writer because of the occasional failures of the general assembly
or the courts to distinguish sharply between quasi-legislation and quasi-
adjudication.
Finally, the writer must explain his failure to distinguish between
substantive and procedural law. The first reason is that students of
administrative law may honestly differ over the question of whether
procedure is limited to such things as notice, hearing, and publication
requirements. For example, the writer believes that statutory standards
are guide lines for administrative agents and should be considered as
part of the adjectival rather than substantive side of the law. Secondly,
while the emphasis is on procedural safeguards, the writer hopes to
demonstrate in his conclusions that those affected by administrative rules
are primarily concerned about the substance of the sub-legislation, not
the procedures whereby the rules are adopted and issued. If these con-
clusions are at all meritorious, they might suggest that the reform move-
ments of the past several decades have been misdirected.
1. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF UNSAFEGUARDED ADMINISTRATIVE
LEGISLATION
At both the national and state levels the legislative function of
administrative agencies evolved in similar fashion, and the movement to
reform procedures and provide legislative supervision and guidance has
been of recent date. Two reasons may be suggested for this delay: first,
the time and energies of both the opponents and the proponents of
regulatory administration were exhausted in debate over questions about
delegation of authority and diffusion of power; second, the legislators
were primarily concerned with the establishment of effective methods
for coping with the increasingly complex problems of an industrialized
society, evidently believing that new administrative techniques could be
sufficiently safeguarded by old judicial remedies.
New methods of problem solving were demanded as society moved
from a frontier to a more complex social setting, yet the introduction
and expansion of these new methods were vigorously protested. For the
most part the critics tried to prevent administrative legislation and adjudi-
cation by appealing to Anglo-American ideas about the supremacy of
law, and by raising constitutional questions about delegated authority
and separation of powers. The futility of such arguments in the face of
,increasingly complex demands upon government was brought into focus
by the predictions of Walter Gellhorn in 1940. He claimed for admin-
istrative law a three phase development with the last stage occurring
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when concern was "addressed chiefly not to constitutional divisions of
power, not to appropriate boundaries of judicial review, but to the pro-
cedure of administration itself."' Obviously his review of the totality of
this development revealed that the third stage evolved only when erstwhile
critics of the administrative process accepted the inevitable entrenchment
of substantial administrative government.
If the critics are to be blamed for the delay in imposing procedural
requirements upon the new administrative techniques, then no less guilty
of shortsightedness were the innovators. They emphasized effectiveness
in securing quick treatment and solution of complex problems. However,
their failure to establish within the organic and regulatory acts reasonable
standards to guide those charged with administrative responsibilities
caused delays instead of speed. The added burdens thereby imposed upon
the courts, and the unnecessary delays which attended judicial action
might have been prevented if administrative procedure had been a legis-
lative concern at an earlier date.
Not all men were blind to the situation which had evolved. The need
for accepting administrative regulation as inevitable and for improving
administrative procedure had been recognized by Elihu Root in 1916.
In his presidential address to the American Bar Association he spoke of
one field of development in law which demanded earnest attention:
We are entering upon the creation of administrative law
quite different in its machinery, its remedies, and its necessary
safeguards from the old methods of regulation by specific
statutes enforced by the courts. As a community passes from
simple to complex conditions the only way in which govern-
ment can deal with the increased burdens thrown upon it is by
delegation of power to be exercised in detail by subordinate
agents, subject to the control of general directions prescribed
by superior authority. . . . Yet the powers that are committed
to these regulating agencies, and which they must have to do
their work, carry with them great and dangerous opportunities
of oppression and wrong. If we are to continue a government of
limited powers these agencies of regulation must themselves be
regulated. The limits of their power over the citizen must be
fixed and determined. The rights of the citizen against them
must be made plain. A system of administrative law must be
1. Symposium on Procedural Administrative Law: Introduction, 25 IoWA L. REv.
421, 422 (1940).
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developed, and tliat with us is still in its infancy, crude and
imperfect.2
As seen by Root the problem was one of accepting a de facto situation
which, on the one hand, forced into retirement time-worn arguments
about organic features of government, and, on the other hand, demanded
a renewed interest in preventing arbitrary exercises of power.3
A reference to accomplished fact rather than mere inevitability
would not have been amiss. It might even have enabled Root to bring
the central problem into sharper focus. His examples of federal and
state agencies in existence in 1916 suggest that these were already
concrete fixtures of government, therefore something beyond rather than
at the threshold of change. Highly suggestive that the regulatory agencies
were firmly rooted by that time were their longevity (the Interstate
Commerce Commission was approaching its thirtieth birthday) and court
approval of the quasi-legislative4 and quasi-judicial' powers which they
exercised.
Two decades passed before serious consideration was given to the
problem which had been outlined by Root. Then, within the relatively
brief span of ten years, a spate of studies, recommendations, model acts,
and statutes' appeared. In 1937 a Committee on Administrative Agencies
and Tribunals was created within the Section of Judicial Administration
of the American Bar Association. In 1938 this committee submitted a
report on Judicial Review of State Administrative Action in State
Courts.' The freshest of reform proposals became a stream as the
Association's work on improving both federal' and state administrative
procedure was supplemented by the model act of the National Conference
2. ABA REPORT AND DRAFT OF BILL BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW 4 (1939).
3. Ibid.
4. Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491 (1872); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). In-
diana's examples include Fertich v. Michener, 111 Ind. 472, 11 N.E. 605 (1887), and
Blue v. Beach, 155 Ind. 121, 56 N.E. 89 (1900). In the latter case the court rejected
the claim that a delegation of rule making powers contravened the constitution, stating
that the constitutional prohibition would "not properly be extended so as to prevent the
grant of legislative authority, to some administrative board or other tribunal, to adopt
rules, by-laws, or ordinances" for the carrying out of a particular purpose. Id. at 132.
5. Indiana's jurists resisted all efforts to have certain administrative functions
labeled quasi-judicial, acknowledging only that administrative officials exercised a dis-
cretion analogous to judicial discretion. Elmore v. Overton, 104 Ind. 548, 4 N.E. 197
(1885); Burroughs v. Webster, 150 Ind. 607, 50 N.E. 750 (1898), and Southern Ind.
Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 172 Ind. 113, 87 N.E. 966 (1909).
6. E.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011 (1958) and the
several state procedure acts. For a discussion of the latter see HEADY, ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE LEGISLATION IN THE STATES (1952).
7. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1957).
8. ABA REPORT, mipra note 2.
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of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,9 the Logan-Walter Bill,1"
the report of the United States Attorney General's Committee on Admin-
istrative Procedure (Acheson Committee)," and the "Benjamin Re-
port.' '12
Underlying these studies and proposals was a general dissatisfaction
with administrative procedure at both the state and national levels."
That there was a basis for such dissatisfaction is apparent in the Acheson
Committee's general statement about deficiencies in the administrative
process, and the specific findings of Professor Horack 4 and Mr. Robert
Hollowell" with regard to administrative legislation in Indiana.
The Acheson Committee summarized the criticisms of the reformers
in stating:
Where necessary information must be secured through oral
discussion or inquiry, it is natural that parties should complain
of a "government of men." Where public regulation is not ade-
quately expressed in rules, complaints regarding "unrestrained
delegation of legislative authority' are aggravated. Where the
process of decision is not clearly outlined, charges of 'star cham-
ber proceedings' may be anticipated. Where the basic outlines of
a fair hearing are not affirmatively set forth in procedural rules,
parties are less likely to feel assured that opportunity for such
hearing is afforded.'
These were indeed serious charges. They suggest why debates over regu-
latory administration were frequently punctuated with the allegation that
a government of men rather than of law existed. If it were necessary
for those who were affected by administrative rules to take the initiative
9. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT (1957).
10. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 4 of the Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives on Bills to Provide for the More Expeditious Settlement of
Disputes with the United States. 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 114-155 (1939) [hereinafter
cited as Report of Subcommittee No. 4].
11. Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1941).
12. ROBERT M. BENYAMIN, ADmINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW
YORK: REPORT TO HONORABLE HERBERT H. LEHiMAN (1942).
13. This is evident in statements by President Roosevelt and Governor Lehman,
when they proposed the need for studies of procedural reform. See the president's letter
of February 16, 1939 in Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, op. cit. supra
note 11 at i; and Governor Lehman's comments in his message to the legislature, cited
in BENJAMIN, op. cit. supra note 12 at i.
14. Professor Horack was a member of the faculty, School of Law, Indiana
University, until his death in November 1957.
15. Mr. Hollowell served as chief counsel in the office of the attorney general in
the 1940's and was instrumental in obtaining legislation in administrative procedure in
1945 and 1947.
16. Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, op. cit. supra note 11 at 25.
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'to learn about the rules and regulations in force, then there was a denial
of the Anglo-American idea about certainty in the law. There is in this
allegation also a criticism of the legislators for not defining clearly the
areas of authority and responsibilitly of adminstrative agencies.
Administrative rule making in Indiana was subject to criticisms
similar to those voiced by the Acheson Committee. Professor Horack's
monumental compilation of administrative rules and regulations 7 was
the product of many hours of searching the files and safes of state house
offices. He later informed Dean Leon Wallace that too often rules and
regulations in force were gathering dust in a corner, while the people
and interests affected by them were unaware and uninformed of their exis-
tence. 8 Mr. Hollowell, who served as chief counsel in the attorney gen-
eral's office, reported that the attorney general's staff had considerable
difficulty in determining what rules and regulations were in force, and
when they were called upon to introduce one in court, "it was difficult to
obtain information as to when it had been adopted or whether it had been
properly and legally adopted."19 These were unfavorable commentaries
on administrative rule making in Indiana and largely explain the reform
legislation of 194320 and 1945.2"
2. ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING LEGISLATION
By 1943 some Hoosier legislators were sufficiently concerned about
the reported shortcomings of administrative rule making to introduce
reform measures: the Slenker Bill in the lower chamber 2 and Senate
Bill 227 initiated by Senators Johnson and Eichhorn. The latter was
passed. It called for executive approval of agencies' rules and the filing
of sub-legislation with the secretary of state. Although the measure was
brief and barely touched upon the problems of reform, its adoption repre-
sented a significant initial step.23 It also illustrated the piecemeal fashion
whereby this type of reform reaches the statute books. After the 1943
legislative session, leadership in reform of administrative procedure came
from the executive branch, as Governor Gates and Attorney General Em-
mert authorized the creation of a study committee within the office of
17. HORACK, INDIANA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE (1941).
18. This information was provided to the writer by Dean Leon H. Wallace, School
of Law, Indiana University.
19. Letter to the writer, October 24, 1958.
20. 1943 Ind. Laws ch. 213.
21. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 60-1501-11 (Burns 1961).
22. This bill proposed the creation of a state administrative board to pass upon all
gub-legislation issued by state agencies. H.B. 162. The original is filed in the Archives
Division of the Indiana State Library, Indianapolis.
23. The 1943 act was specifically repealed by the 1945 rule making act, its several
provisions having been incorporated in the latter.
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the attorney general.2" Because of the limited time available to the com-
mittee, it soon became apparent that a comprehensive procedure bill could
not be drafted before the opening of the 1945 legislative session. Conse-
quently the committee decided to concentrate upon matters relating to
administrative rule making and leave to the 1947 session the task of
drafting a bill that would treat the other matters of administrative regu-
lation. -2
As previously noted, sub-legislation was subject to the same harsh
criticisms in Indiana as were voiced elsewhere. Generally the critics had
denounced the sub-legislative process as undemocratic, and because of the
n6n-representative composition of administrative boards and commis-
sions, they rejected any contention that this process was essentially
the same as traditional lawmaking.26 The reformers further demanded
that legislators prescribe a uniform rule making procedure, and that all
agencies be brought within the provisions of the laws.27 They also pro-
posed that those persons required to comply with administrative rules
be given an opportunity to express their views thereon, and that the public
have access to, or be promptly informed about, rules in force.28
The removal of the shortcomings at which these proposals were di-
rected was the expressed objective of the General Assembly in 1945,21 yet
a matter of little apparent concern in 1943. In 1943 the attention of the
legislators was focused on the form of administrative rules rather than
the sub-legislative process. Nonetheless, the 1943 act must be included
as an important part of procedural reform in Indiana because of certain
features. The law required that all rules thereafter adopted be submitted
to the attorney general and governor for approval, and that copies be
filed with the secretary of state and legislative bureau. It also made cer-
tified rules and regulations admissible as evidence in any court pro-
ceeding.
24. Two members of the attorney general's staff, Cleon Foust and Robert Hollowell,
became interested in the problems pertaining to administrative procedure. With the
support of the governor and attorney general, they undertook the drafting of an
administrative procedure bill.
25. Mr. Hollowell provided this background information to the writer.
26. See especially Administrative Proceedure in Government Agencies, op. cit. supra
note 11 at 101, and PENNOCK, ADMINISTRATION AND THE RULE OF LAw 47 (1941).
27. Such uniformity was the objective of a Special Committee on Administrative
Law of the ABA. Nevertheless, there were those groups, such as national agencies, the
National Lawyer's Guild, and the New York City Bar Commission, which offered
vigorous dissents. See generally Report of Subcommittee No. 4, note 10 supra.
28. Dean E. Blythe Stason believed that these goals were reached by the Model Act.
Stason, The Model State Adninistrative Procedure Act, 33 IowA L. REv. 196, 200
(1948) ; and see Nathanson, Recent Statutory Developments in State Administrative
Law, 33 IOWA L. R~v. 252, 256 (1948).
29. IND. ANN. STAT. § 60-1501 (Burns 1961).
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The requirement that rules and regulations be approved by the
attorney general and governor, an innovation in reform," was sound for
several reasons. First, the attorney general was implicitly empowered
to confine administrative agencies within constitutional and statutory
bounds. Second, it strengthened the hand of the governor as the state's
political leader and chief administrative officer. Finally, it enabled these
two state officers to determine whether newly issued rules were in con-
flict with existing ones of other agencies."'
Only the provision for filing rules had its counterpart in the Model
State Administrative Procedure Act, 2 although for a different reason.
Under the Model Act the secretary of state was instructed to keep open
to public inspection a register of rules, whereas the Indiana Act required
the secretary of state to certify those rules which were offered as evi-
dence in the courts. The requirements of executive approval of agency
rules and the filing of rules were modest corrective innovations, and
major achievements in procedural reform became the responsibility of
the 1945 legislative session.
For the most part the 1945 act followed those sections in the Model
Act which pertained to rules and rule making. This is apparent in a com-
parison of the corresponding provisions in the two acts. Thus we find
similarities in definitions,33 procedures for adopting rules, and require-
ments regarding the filing, promulgation, compiling, and publication of
rules. Certain differences are to be noted as well, such as the Indiana
Act's greater detail, its requirements that rules be approved by the attor-
ney general and governor, and its provision for judicial notice of rules.3"
And there are provisions in the Model Act which have no counterparts
in the Indiana statute: (1) a right of petition;3" (2) provision for de-
claratory judgments on the validity of rules; and (3) provision for de-
claratory rulings by agencies."
30. North Dakota introduced this control through approval by the attorney general
in 1941; however, Indiana added approval by the governor.
31. These several points were made by Mr. Hollowell in explaining the uniform
procedure statutes to Indiana bar associations.
32. MODEL STATE ADMINIsTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT § 3 (1957); 1943 Ind. Laws,
ch. 213, § 1.
33. There is anything but common agreement with regard to a workable definition
of rule making. Cf., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1001-11 (1958);
MODEL STATE ADINISTRATIVE PROcEDURE AcT § 1 (1957); IND. ANN. STAT. § 60-1503
(Burns 1961) ; CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 11371.
34. The latter two items were carried over from the 1943 Act, which was expressly
repealed in § 13 of the 1945 Act.
35. Under the Model Act interested parties may petition agencies to promulgate,
amend or repeal any rule. This right has been frequently proposed. See, Administrative
Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
36. Dean Stason regarded declaratory judgments and declaratory rulings as
important accomplishments of the Model Act. Stason, supra note 28.
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The main deficiencies in previous rule making methods are evident
in the Indiana Act's statement of intent and requirements of procedures
to be followed. As stated in section 1 this intent is threefold: (1) it
prescribes uniformity in rule making; (2) it secures for the public an
opportunity to participate in the sub-legislative process; and (3) it re-
quires that rules be readily accessible to the general public. 7
Procedures for adopting rules are essentially the same in both acts.
Notice and hearing are required by each act, but the Model Act's use of the
qualifying phrase, "the adopting agency shall so far as practicable," 8
makes this something less than the mandatory provision of the Indiana Act.
The latter specifies that notices are to be published in a Marion County
newspaper of general circulation ten days prior to the date for a hearing
on proposed rules. The law also states that the notice must contain:
(1) a statement of the time and place of the hearing; (2) a reference
to the subject-matter of the rule under consideration; and (3) the in-
formation that copies of the proposed rule may be examined at the office
of the issuing agency.39 The provision for hearing in the Indiana statute
is more elaborate, although in each case all interested parties are given
the opportunity to submit oral or written arguments. 0
Neither of these acts explains who are to be considered "interested
parties" or "interested persons," the terms used. If the public service
commission proposes to issue a rule regarding the size and candlepower
of locomotive headlights, must it regard as "interested parties" the off i-
cials from cities, towns, and townships served by the railroads? The Indi-
ana Act, as indeed all others, leaves this matter in question. Possibly it is
within the discretion of the administrative officials, although, by way of
example, section 4 merely states that "any interested party in person or
by attorney shall be afforded an adequate opportunity to participate in
the formulation of the proposed rule or rules" by presenting facts and
arguments. The administrative body must give full consideration to all
relevant matters; but may it prevent certain parties, whose "interest"
might be questioned, from taking part in a hearing? A later paragraph
in this section is at least more specific in authorizing agencies to invite
facts, arguments and suggestions from interested persons, thereby im-
plying that it is within the board's discretion to determine whom it will
invite.
37. IND. ANN. STAT. § 60-1501 (Burns 1961).
38. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 2(3) (1957).
39. IND. ANN. STAT. § 60-1504 (Burns 1961).
40. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 2(3) (1957) ; IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 60-1504 (Burns 1961).
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Each act imposes upon the agencies the duty of filing regulations
with the secretary of state,4 who, in turn, is required to compile, index,
and publish the rules.42 Under the Indiana Act the secretary of state is
instructed to assemble the rules, arrange them by the titles of the issuing
agencies, and publish them annually in cumulative form.43 The law guar-
antees easy access to the rules by requiring that the annual volumes be
distributed to designated county, state and federal officials and be sold
to the general public.44 With the present requirement for official publi-
cation of the rules, it is no longer necessary for them to be certified be-
fore a court may take cognizance of them.4"
Neither the Indiana nor the Model Act has a provision similar to
the exceptional one in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act which
places the burden of proof on the proponent of a rule or order." Nor does
the Indiana Act have a section expressly authorizing judicial review, such
as is found in the Model Act47 and this state's administrative adjudica-
tion act of 1947.48 While the provisions of the Indiana Act do not limit
the scope of judicial review, they at least suggest the legislature's intent
to reduce or limit judicial action with respect to rule making procedure,
an inference being possible from certain statements in the statute: (1) a
proviso in the notice section "that no rule shall be invalid because the
reference to the subject-matter thereof in said notice may be inadequate
or insufficient;" '49 or (2) from section 11, wherein it is said:
Any such rule or regulation adopted, approved, recorded
and published as herein provided shall be judicially noticed by
all courts and agencies of this state and the official publication
thereof as herein provided shall be prima facie evidence that
41. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT § 3 (1957); IND. ANN. STAT.§ 60-1505 (Burns 1961). The latter also includes the requirement that rules be approved
by the governor and attorney general, and it demands compliance with the provisions of
the act before rules may be considered in force.
42. MODEL STATE ADmINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr § 4 (1957); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 60-1507 (Burns 1961).
43. IND. ANN. STAT. § 60-1509 (Burns 1961). The several agencies are authorized
to print pamphlets containing rules and information statements about the agency's
internal and field organization. These pamphlets may be sold to the general public at
cost. IND. ANN. STAT. § 60-1508 (Burns 1961).
44. IND. ANN. STAT. § 60-1507 (Burns 1961).
45. IND. ANN. STAT. § 60-1511 (Burns 1961).
46. Professor Sherwood found the Administrative Procedure Act's provision harsh
and burdensome when applied to agencies, because (1) it implied that rules had to be
supported by evidence, and (2) the "statute does not even specify what is to be proved."
Sherwood, Administrative Procedure and Civil Liberties, 33 CORNEL L.Q. 235 (1947).
47. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 6(2) (1957).
48. IN . ANN. STAT. § 63-3014 (Burns 1961).
49. IND. ANN. STAT. § 60-1504 (Burns 1961).
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said rule or regulation was adopted, approved and filed as here-
in provided.
State exz rel. Sights v. Edwards"° demonstrates that a prima facie presump-
tion does not prevent a judicial inquiry into procedures, whether because of
a challenge or on the initiative of the court. In Sights the rule in question
had been published along with many others of the state board of education,
but this rule had not been approved by the governor and the attorney
general, a matter which was determined by the court upon examination
of the cumulative rules publication of the office of secretary of state.
Certain matters pertinent to a discussion of judicial review of ad-
ministrative rules should be discussed. First, with regard to the substance
of rules, a backward glance over the decisions of the Indiana courts would
lead to a conclusion similar to one expressed by Professor Fuchs: the
cases "are emphatic in espousing the basic proposition that the special
competence of administrative agencies should have scope to operate and
that the courts in reviewing agency actions should not attempt to super-
vise the agencies' work or do it over again."'" In view of the hold-
ings of the judges, and the narrow role that they carved for themselves
in reviewing agency actions, it was not necessary to specify in the stat-
utes a right of judicial review. 2 The judicially determined procedure
for review has long operated on the premise that judicial review of agency
rules did not depend upon legislative authorization.53 The court had
limited itself in the exercise of its power of judicial review of rules to
considering questions about (1) their reasonableness; (2) excess of
power; (3) conflict with the Constitution or statutes; and (4) violation
of principles of justice. 4
One additional feature of the Model Act, which was not incorpor-
ated into the Indiana Act, demands some consideration. In his commen-
tary on the Model Act Dean E. Blythe Stason had said:
50. 228 Ind. 13, 88 N.E.2d 763 (1950).
51. Fuchs, Judicial Control of Administrative Agemwies in Indiana: I, 28 IND. L.J.
1, 2 (1952).
52. Blue v. Beach, 155 Ind. 121, 56 N.E. 89 (1900); In re Northwestern Ind. Tel.
Co., 201 Ind. 667, 171 N.E. 65 (1930) ; Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E. 438
(1934); Albert v. Milk Control Board, 210 Ind. 283, 200 N.E. 688 (1936); Financial
Aid Corp. v. Wallace, 216 Ind. 114, 23 N.E.2d 472 (1939) ; Warren v. Indiana Tel. Co.,
217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d 399 (1946).
53. E.g., in Financial Aid Corp. v. Wallace, 216 Ind. 114, 122, 23 N.E.2d 472 (1939)
the court said, "In the case at bar the act does not provide for an appeal from the
order made by the Department of Financial Institutions, nevertheless, the appellant is
now present in the court questioning the acts of the department and the authority
granted by the Legislature."
54. Blue v. Beach, 155 Ind. 121, 56 N.E. 89 (1900) ; Financial Aid Corp. v. Wallace,
216 Ind. 114, 122, 23 N.E.2d 472 (1939) ; In re Northwestern Ind. Tel. Co., 201 Ind.
667, 171 N.E. 65 (1930).
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Recognizing the wisdom and effectiveness of declaratory
judgment procedures in courts of law, advantage is taken of
the principle by prescribing a similar procedure for testing the
validity of administrative rules. The validity of any rule may
be tested in a court of appropriate jurisdiction on petition of any
person whose legal rights or privileges are impaired or threat-
ened. The declaratory rulings on specific fact situations by the
administrative agencies themselves on application of interested
persons who may be unjustifiably uncertain with respect to the
possible application to them of any rule or statute enforceable
by the agency."5
Indiana's refusal to make provision for declaratory rulings and de-
claratory judgments was dictated largely by situations peculiar to the
state rather than to questions about their value. Mr. Hollowell informed
this writer of several reasons underlying the committee's decision. He
stated, first, that the act provides for holding conferences "and inviting
and permitting the submission of suggestions, facts, argument and views
of interested persons" in advance of drafting rules." Secondly, Mr.
Hollowell noted that section 8 provides for the publication of rules by
the agencies, including statements about the internal and field organiza-
tion, descriptions of methods for handling matters affecting private par-
ties, "and such other information as would be helpful to the parties af-
fected by the laws, rules and administration" of the agencies. His third
stated reason was that such a provision was opposed by state officials.sI
Items one and two were regarded by the committee as adequate substi-
tutes for declaratory rulings by agencies.
Yet another reason peculiar to Indiana prevented the inclusion of a
provision for declaratory judgments. A decision of the Indiana Supreme
CourtI s while not rendering invalid this state's declaratory judgment act
of 1927, went a long way toward stating a doctrine which, in Professor
Borchard's words, "if applied, will deprive the people of Indiana of many
of the benefits derived from this procedure by other states of the
Union."5 In view of the court's attitude, the Hollowell Committee de-
cided not to jeopardize the rule making act.6"
55. Stason, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, supra note 28.
56. IND. ANN. STAT. § 60-1504 (Bums 1961).
57. These points were made by Mr. Hollowell to the writer.
58. Brindley v. Mears, 207 Ind. 657, 194 N.E. 351 (1935).
59. Borchard, An Indiana Declaratory Judgment, 11 IND. L.J. 376, 377 (1936);
also see Borchard, Declaratory Judgments in Indiana, 19 IND. L.J. 175 (1944) ; Note, 6
NorR DAME LAW. 122 (1930).
60. But it should be noted that Brindley v. Mears, 207 Ind. 657, 194 N.E. 351 (1935),
was not the only case involving the declaratory judgment act. See Zoercher v. Agler,
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With the adoption of this statute Indiana became one of the first
states to institute reforms along suggested lines. Like the Model Act,
Indiana's held promise of minimizing arbitrary exercises of quasi-
legislative power. The provisions for notice and hearing offered guaran-
tees for advance warning of rules to be adopted and active participation
by those who would be affected; and other statutory requirements
that rules be published and easily accessible to the general public preserved
to the individual that element of certainty which is embraced within
the meaning of the rule of law. Such safeguards and guarantees were
not often found in earlier laws conferring legislative powers on agencies.
3. HISTORICAL BASIS-STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND JUDICIAL
DEMANDS FOR PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
There is little about early rule making in Indiana to merit acclaim,
and much to support the reformers' charges that the quasi-legislative
process did not measure up to minimum principles. The earlier statutes
prescribed a few procedures, especially requirements for publicizing rules
and regulations in force, but more frequently the statutes were devoid
of such provisions, the legislators either being unconcerned or believing
that such were not necessary. Nor did the decisions in early cases involv-
ing administrative rules reveal any special concern by the courts over the
procedural question.
In Fertic. v. Michener6' the court had accepted the doctrine espoused
in other jurisdictions 2 that the power to take charge of a school system
carried with it the authority to make all rules necessary to govern the
schools. But this, the court said:
does not imply that all the rules, orders and regulations for the
discipline, government and management of the schools shall be
made a matter of record by the school board, or that every act,
order or direction affecting the conduct of such school shall be
authorized or confirmed by a formal vote. No system of rules,
however carefully prepared, can provide for every emergency,
or meet every requirement. In consequence, much must neces-
sarily be left to the individual members of the school boards,
202 Ind. 214, 172 N.E. 186 (1930); Rauh v. Fletcher Savings Co., 207 Ind. 638, 194
N.E. 334 (1935).
61. 111 Ind. 472, 11 N.E. 605 (1887).
62. Thompson v. Beaver, 63 Ill. 353 (1872); Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass. 198
(1849); People v. Medical Society, 24 Barb. 570 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857); Ferriter v.
Tyler, 48 Vt. 444 (1876).
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and to the superintendents of, and the teachers in, the several
schools.68
Apparently the Indiana court had not foreseen that rules had to be made
a matter of record if certainty in the law were to be realized; and by
suggesting that formal procedures were not required and that the issuance
of rules might be dictated by emergency situations, the court seemed
to be vesting in the officials a discretion limited solely by the judicial
demand that rules be reasonable. In other words, the judges were willing
to test the substance of the rules; they were not willing to impose
procedural requirements. The court's position on the procedural question
was in accord with earlier decisions of other jurisdictions,64 and with such
later U.S. cases as Butterfield v. Stranahan.,68 and Bi-Metallic Investment
Co. v. State Board of Equalization.66
A significant problem of interpretation arises at this point. In the
earlier cases Indiana's judges failed to distinguish between the legislative
and adjudicatory powers of administrative agencies. At most they were
willing to acknowledge that administrative officials exercised a discretion
analogous to judicial discretion, and they subsumed all administrative
powers under the words "ministerial" or "legislative."67 Confusion arises
from such haphazard use of these words, since there is no suggestion as
to which, if any, administrative powers should be exercised in accordance
with prescribed procedures. To illustrate this problem consideration
may be given to two decisions" of the Indiana court in the last years of
the nineteenth century.
Both cases dealt with licensing, a power which may properly be
described as legislative in nature, since it could be exercised directly by the
General Assembly. The court characterized licensing as ministerial, and it
insisted that no procedural safeguards were required, since this power
was not judicial in nature. In a sense the court was caught in a paradox
of its own making. On the one hand, it upheld delegations of licensing
powers to administrative agents, and it even admitted that the exercise
of this authority was "so far analogous to a judicial discretion" that
officials were "protected from any claim for damages on account of any
mere mistake" in deciding to grant or withhold a license.6" But, on the
63. Fertich v. Michener, 111 Ind. 472, 482, 11 N.E. 605 (1887).
64. Den v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 18 How. 59 U.S. 272 (1856);
Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201 (1874).
65. 192 U.S. 470 (1903).
66. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
67. See especially Elmore v. Overton, 104 Ind. 548 (1885) ; Burroughs v. Webster,
150 Ind. 607 (1898) ; and Southern Ind. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 172 Ind. 113 (1909).
68. Wilkins v. State, 113 Ind. 514 (1887); Burroughs v. Webster, supra note 67.
69. Elmore v. Overton, 104 Ind. 548 (1885).
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
other hand, the court did not want to carry this analogy so far that it
would be claiming for administrative officials powers which were largely
judicial in character. Indeed, in each of the first several cases the court
had held that the General Assembly could not confer judicial powers on
other than judicial officers."'
The court did not escape from this paradox, but at least its defini-
tion of licensing permitted it to circumvent demands for surrounding
ministerial powers with procedural safeguards. This was apparent in
Wilkins v. State." In holding that dental examining boards were not
tribunals, the court said that it was a mistake to assume that the laws
(under which the boards operated) had to "conform to all requirements
as to notice and like incidents that would be necessary if the act were
judicial," (i.e., conferred a judicial power).2 As far as the court was
concerned an applicant for a license needed no notice other than the
public law.73 This was still true a decade later when the judges said that
they could not understand what failure as to notice was shown in the
statute, for the law was notice of legislative intent to recall old licenses
and allow reasonable time in which to obtain new ones.74 Actually notice
and hearing provisions had been included in the law in question, the 1897
act which had established the Board of Medical Registration and Exami-
nation. 5 In fact, its requirements were such that they elicited from the
court the comment that this law was a much more guarded and limited
exercise of police power than similar statutes of other states which had
been held constitutional.76 But this parenthetical comment did not affect
the court's ruling, for it was obvious that its attitude toward procedural
requirements had not changed since Fertic. v. Michener and Wilkins
v. State. Theer were parallels to be noted between these decisions and
those of other jurisdictions.
The Indiana cases are significant because of analogies drawn be-
tween niinisterial functions and the legislative process, and because of the
court's refusal to claim any similarity between administrative and judicial
functions, a position that was not unlike that stated by the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1856"z and with similar results. At that time the U.S. Supreme
Court had said that a summary action without the safeguards of the
judicial system was not unknown to the common law, even though certain
70. Ibid.; and see State ex rel. French v. Johnson, 105 Ind. 463 (1885).
71. 113 Ind. 514 (1887).
72. Id. at 516.
73. Ibid.
74. State ex rel. Burroughs v. Webster, 150 Ind. 607, 615 (1898).
75. 1897 Ind. Laws ch. 169.
76. State ex rel. Burroughs v. Webster, 150 Ind. 607, 615 (1898).
77. Den v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 18 How. 59 U.S. 272 (1856).
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acts of administrative officials are judicial in nature."' Similarly, a
Michigan court held in Weimer v. Bunbury that an individual may be
temporarily deprived of liberty or property as a consequence of an ad-
ministrative action yet have no redress under the common law."9 Admini-
strative proceedings, the court said, are almost universally conducted
"without judicial forms, and without the intervention of judicial author-
ity; the few cases in which statutes have required the action of courts
being exceptional.""0 The evidence has been such that Professor Foster
Sherwood could point to four fields of governmental activity "where
notice and hearing were not required at the common law as a prerequisite"
to action."'
Some of these actions, such as those which came before the United
States, Michigan, and Indiana courts, may have enough of the characteris-
tics of a judicial action to warrant the claim that they are quasi-judicial
functions; therefore, courtlike proceedings should be employed. In the
several cases previously discussed there was some agreement with the claim
of similarity; however, the courts' use of such terms as "purely admini-
strative" or "ministerial" to describe all kinds of administrative action
enabled them to circumvent demands for formal proceedings. The latter
point is explained by Professor Fuchs in his statement that there was
relatively little in the decisions of the Indiana courts regarding "pro-
cedural requirements surrounding the formulation and issuance of general
regulations," largely because of the traditional absence of such require-
ments "and the freedom of the legislature itself to frame its enactments
without extending opportunities for appearance or other procedural
courtesies to affected parties."82
The court's attitude with regard to procedural requirements may or
may not have been of concern to the legislature when conferring rule
making powers on administrative agencies; but any presumption that the
legislators were concerned about such things as procedural safeguards or
the court's attitude thereto cannot be supported after a survey of such
legislation, beginning with the 1881 health board act. The fact that
statutory requirements range from no prescribed methods for issuing
272 (1856).
78. Id. at 280.
79. 30 Mich. 201, 210 (1874).
80. Ibid.
81. He includes (1) military law, Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) ; (2) taxation,
Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), and the two cases just discussed;
(3) eminent domain, Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57 (1919); and (4) public health
and safety regulations, People ex rel. Lodes v. Dep't of Health, 189 N.Y. 187 (1907).
Sherwood, supra note 46 at 242.
82. Fuchs, Judicial Control of Administrative Agencies it Indiana: II, 28 IND.
L.J. 293, 308 (1953).
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rules to somewhat elaborate statements on this matter suggests that
initiators of legislative proposals did not look far-if at all-to determine
what previous legislators had done.
Provisions for notice and hearing are not to be found in early laws
empowering various agencies to issue rules; yet certain other procedural
requirements, and especially demands for publicizing rules in force, were
usual rather than exceptional. These laws are quite different with regard
to procedures. For example, the 1881 health board act merely required
that rules be promulgated,83 a not too significant guide for board mem-
bers, yet more than what was required in the public health acts of 189184
and 1899." Somewhat more elaborate procedural requirements were
found in statutes establishing the livestock commission and the office
of state veterinarian in 1889,8" the labor commission in 1897,7 and the
medical and dental licensing agencies.88 Detailed statements about printing
and making available for public examination the rules in force promised
certainty in the law. Among the more noteworthy features were stipula-
tions that the livestock commission's rules and quarantines could take
effect only when officially proclaimed by the governor," and that the
labor commission's rules governing arbitration proceedings be adopted
"with the advice and assistance of the Attorney-General of the State."9
While these were not significant as safeguards, they might at least
have provided subsequent legislatures with models. That the legislators
did not search for models becomes more evident in the period 1900-1920,
a time in which the railway and public service commissions were created.
While extensive procedural requirements were prescribed in the statutes
establishing these two agencies, the laws endowing other agencies with
rule making powers were, for the most part, significant only because of
their informational requirements.
In 1901 the state veterinarian was instructed to publish rules "from
time to time," 1 a provision that was anything but a guarantee that the
people affected by the rules would be adequately informed about them.
Far more definitive was the statement on publication requirements in. a
1915 statute, for there the veterinarian was instructed to publish his rules
83. 1881 Ind. Laws ch. 19, § 9.
84. 1891 Ind. Laws ch. 15.
85. 1899 Ind. Laws ch. 121.
86. 1889 Ind. Laws ch. 212.
87. 1897 Ind. Laws ch. 88, as amended 1899 Ind. Laws ch. 128.
88. Medical licensing law, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 63-1301-15 (Burns 1961); dental
licensing law, 1899 Ind. Laws ch. 211.
89. 1889 Ind. Laws ch. 212, § 9.
90. 1897 Ind. Laws ch. 88, § 11 and 1899 Ind. Laws ch. 128, § 11.
91. 1901 Ind. Laws, ch. 64, § 2.
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in one or more papers of general circulation and to post quarantine notices
and rules as set forth in the act.92 He was also required to file copies of
sub-legislation with county auditors, who, in turn, were to publish the
rules locally.
Certainty about rules in effect could be expected also under the health
board act of 1909."3 Its provisions are unique, matched by few laws of
that period. Under this law the board was instructed to publish its rules
in pamphlet form and distribute them to designated officials and the
public on request. As a further guarantee that publicity would be given,
county health officers were required to annunce publicly the existence
and receipt of the rules.94 Equally important was an act of 1911 designed
to protect the health of school children by providing for medical examina-
tion and the appointment of school physicians. In that law the state
boards of health and education were authorized to issue jointly:
rules for the detail enforcement of the purposes of this act,
which rules shall bear the printed seals of the said boards, the
said rules to be printed and promulgated by the state printing
board, promulgation to consist in supplying a reasonable number
of copies to each county superintendent from whom all who are
interested may procure a copy.95
Seldom did the statutes contain such detailed statements on informational
requirements; more often the acts merely authorized the issuance of such
rules as the agency considered necessary to achieve the stated purposes.
Examples of the latter point are found in health board acts in 1903,05
1911,17 and 1919," and the pure food and drug law of 1907." Some of
the other acts of that period, such as two in 1907 empowering the state
chemist... and board of pharmacy'0' to issue rules and regulations, and
those of 1909 and 1913 pertaining to the regulatory powers of the boards
of state charities02 and pharmacy' were devoid of informational and
other procedural requirements. On the other hand, the veterinary licens-
92. 1915 Ind. Laws ch. 138, § 2.
93. 1909 Ind. Laws ch. 144.
94. 1909 Ind. Laws ch. 144, § 3.
95. IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-3605 (Bums 1933).
96. 1903 Ind. Laws ch. 83.
97. 1911 Ind. Laws ch. 71.
98. 1919 Ind. Laws ch. 56.
99. 1907 Ind. Laws ch. 104.
100. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 16-1001-11 (Burns 1950).
101. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 63-1101-03; 1113-14 (Burns 1961).
102. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 22-2401-15 (Bums 1950).
103. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 63-1102, 1103, 1113 (Bums 1961).
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ing law ordered that sub-legislation be published and available for public
examination.""
The marked contrast between these several acts and that which
established the railroad commission in 1905105 is obvious on examination.
Rather than a mere statement that rules shall be issued when considered
necessary, the 1905 act specifies seven subjects to be covered by sub-
legislation.' Moreover, provision was made for revision of rules, rates,
and classifications in accordance with defined procedures, including
notice, hearing, and the compulsory attendance of witnesses."0 ' Addi-
tional consideration was given to procedure in the amending laws of 1907
and 1911.1"8
The informational requirements of the 1905 act seem adequate, for
the commission was instructed to furnish each railway company with
copies of rules and regulations twenty days before they entered into
force.0 9 The law also stated that published rules were to "be admissible in
evidence in any suit and sufficient to establish the fact" that the rules,
orders, and classifications were official acts of the commission."0
Like the federal Administrative Procedure Act the railroad com-
mission act determined where the burden of proof would lie. However,
unlike the federal law this one placed the burden on the plaintiff, who,
by definition, could never be the commission, since this section was opera-
tive only when an appeal was taken to the court from a determination of
the agency. Placing the burden on the complainant was in accord with
the court's ruling in Home v. Beil,"' a ruling that was followed in such
later cases as Pittsburgh R.R. v. Railroad Comm'n," 2 and Vonnegut v.
Baun."' Only recently has the court departed from this ruling in rate
making cases.""
The provisions of the several railroad commission laws guaranteeing
such rights as notice, hearing and participation in the rule making process,
and even authorizing private parties to request either new rules or
modifications of existing ones, were in the nature of the reforms proposed
104. This was essentially the same as those found in the medical and dental licensing
laws of 1897 and 1899.
105. 1905 Ind. Laws ch. 53.
106. 1905 Ind. Laws ch. 53, § 3.
107. 1905 Ind. Laws ch. 53, § 4.
108. InD. ANN. STAT. §§ 55-101; 110-113, 115, 117-122, 125-130 (Bums 1951).
109. IND. ANN. STAT. § 55-114 (Burns 1951). In 1907 this was reduced to ten days.
110. IND. ANN. STAT. § 55-111 (Bums 1951).
111. 157 Ind. 25, 60 N.E. 672 (1901).
112. 171 Ind. 189, 86 N.E. 328 (1908).
113. 206 Ind. 172, 188 N.E. 786 (1934).
114. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Indianapolis Rys., 225 Ind. 30, 72 N.E.2d 434 (1947);
Public Serv. Comm'n v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 235 Ind. 1, 130 N.E.2d 467 (1955).
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some years later. However, with the exception of the public service com-
mission law of 1913, these did not set a new trend in statutes conferring
sub-legislative powers.
In 1913 railroads and other utilities were brought under the control
of the public service commission." 5  The procedural safeguards still
applied in the regulation of railroads, but new procedures, largely in de-
termining and confirming rate schedules and charges," 6 were provided
for the other utilities. Elsewhere in the law the commission was em-
powered:
to adopt reasonable and proper rules and regulations relative to
all inspections, tests, audits and investigations, and to adopt and
publish reasonable and proper rules to govern its proceedings,
and to regulate the mode and manner of all investigations of
public utilities and other parties before it. All hearings shall
be open to the public." 7
The railroad and public service commission acts were exemplary in that
or any other period, for their procedural requirements, if faithfully fol-
16wed, could not be realistically challenged either by the reformers or
those individuals affected by the laws.
An assertion that a commission rate order was contrary to the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment was set aside by the Indiana
court in the following year with the statement:
Appellants but feebly contend that the element of due pro-
cess of law is absent from the statute, and the order made in
pursuance thereof. It is shown that the ten days' notice required
by the statute of the filing of the cement company's petition was
served upon the appellants; that both companies appeared and
resisted a modification or reduction of rates. Each was entitled
to, and had, a hearing."'
Presumably one could not successfully challenge a rule or regulation
under the due process clause if adequate procedures were required by
law. But this was not to say that notice and hearing had always to be
provided, for later the court noted that it was the law that regulatory
powers were exercised exclusively by the legislature or its duly authorized
115. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 54-105-07; 201-22; 301-22; 401-29; 439-42; 501-11;
601-14; 701-20 (Burns 1951).
116. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 54-107, 204, 217, 222, 304-06, 309, 313-18, 401, 408-15,
419, 423-24, 426-28, 429, 440, 712 (Burns 1951).
117. IND. ANN. STAT. § 54-401 (Burns 1951).
118. Southern Ind. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 172 Ind. 113, 126, 87 N.E. 966 (1909).
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agent. "Whether the mode adopted by that body is wise or unwise is not
a matter of judicial cognizance," for the courts could interfere "only
when the legislative method violates some provision of the Constitu-
tion.""' In this and other decisions the court did not indicate what
procedures would be necessary to keep both statutes and regulations
within constitutional bounds.
Questions about agency procedures were answered by the ,court in
Vandalia R.R. v. Railroad Comm'. 2°  The company had challenged
the validity of the 1909 act,"' because it authorized the commission
to make and enforce orders without providing for notice and hear-
ing; and it objected to the commission's order to install new loco-
motive headlights, claiming that this was a costly undertaking and depri-
vation of property without due process of law.'22 In answer to the first
objection the court stated that the law in question was supplemental to the
1905 act which had prescribed procedures. 2 ' Moreover, the court deter-
mined that there had been a number of hearings, consequently, the com-
pany could not claim that due process had not been served. 24 The court's
answer to the second assertion was based on its claim that the state's
responsibility for protecting public health and safety made all property
"subservient to the State.' 25
In affirming the Vandalia decision, the Supreme Court char-
acterized the Commission's order as "state action, legislative in its
nature,"' 2 a point that was at most only implied by the Indiana Su-
preme Court.'27 Only an appellate court case in Indiana is comparable
in that there was a specific statement that an action such as this might be
taken in the absence of statutory procedural requirements. In Southern
Ry. v. Railroad Cornwvn the appellate court said that it would be difficult
to contend:
that the power of the legislature to enact such legislation would
be paralyzed because it could not determine the reasonableness
of the proposed legislative rate, it being a subject of judicial
investigation and determination. 2 '
119. Id. at 130.
120. Vandalia R.R. v. Railroad Conm'n, 182 Ind. 382, 101 N.E. 85 (1914).
121. IND. ANN. STAT. § 55-107 (Burns 1951).
122. Vandalia R.R. v. Railroad Comm'n, 182 Ind. 382, 385, 101 N.E. 85 (1914).
123. Id. at 392.
124. Ibid.
125. Id. at 393.
126. Vandalia R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 242 U.S. 255, 260 (1916).
127. See Pittsburgh R.R. v. Railroad Comnm'n, 171 Ind. 189, 86 N.E. 328 (1908).
128. 42 Ind. App. 90, 101, 83 N.E. 721 (1908).
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Since the question could not be raised directly against the legislative
power, it could not be raised against the commission which "stands for
the legislature."' 29
Support for this opinion was to be found in Justice Holmes' decision
in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization."0 Holmes
had said that notice and hearing were not prerequisites to legislative
action, a doctrine appealed to by counsel for the public service commission
when the Vandalia case was before the U.S. Supreme Court:
The legislature, by the aid of committees appointed to in-
vestigate the subject, could have prescribed the kind of headlight
without depriving the plaintiff in error of its property without
due process of law, and, if the legislature could have done this
without notice to the plaintiff in error, or without giving it a
chance to be heard, then it could delegate the power to make such
regulation in the same manner to the Railroad Commission"'
The commission wanted it understood that there was no right to a
hearing on the question whether the commission should determine the
condition and efficiency of headlights, "or on the question of whether the
order should be passed.""'
The silence of the Indiana court during this period, and its decision
in a 1918 case . might suggest that the supreme court did not regard as
good law the appellate court's ruling in Southern Ry., or that this was
not an established principle. The 1918 case arose from the public service
commission' s dismissal of a petition for a rate increase. When the court
found that no adequate remedy was provided in the statute to compel
the agency to hold a hearing on a petition, it announced that a common
law writ of mandamus could be issued, requiring the commission to
take jurisdiction."4 It should be noted that the court merely stated that
the petition presented a state of facts over which the commission had
jurisdiction; but there was no hint by the court that it would invalidate
this or any other statute on the grounds that it was silent with regard to
procedural matters.
No pattern emerged in the statutes adopted before 1920 to suggest
a growing awareness on the part of the legislators of the need for pro-
cedural safeguards. Some improvements may be noted between 1920
129. Ibid.
130. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
131. Vandalia R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 242 U.S. 255, 61 L.Ed. 276, 282 (1916).
132. Ibid.
133. Indianapolis Traction Co. v. Lewis, 187 Ind. 564, 120 N.E. 129 (1918).
134. Id. at 574.
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and 1945, and especially within the last decade before the passage of the
administrative rule making act. Even so, there was no consistency on
the part of the legislators.
A failure to prescribe methods for publicizing rules in force is dis-
turbing because of the Anglo-American demand for certainty in the law
and because of the ruling in Cotton v. Commonwealth Loan Co."' There
the court said that licensees are presumed to know the law; and since
the law calls for the issuance of rules and regulations, the licensees are
presumed to know them as well. The validity of this presumption
may be challenged. All statutes are published and easily accessible to the
public, but administrative legislation might or might not be published,
this depending largely on the statutory requirements. The presumption
fails in yet another way. The General Assembly meets at stipulated periods,
and its activities command the attention of the press, while the work of
the several agencies proceeds in relative quiet, the newspapers seldom
giving any attention to the fact that a commission is in session. If we
operate under the notion stated in Fertich v. Michener that sub-legislation
need not be a matter of record,"' or under the presumption stated in
Cotton, then we need not be disturbed by the several laws adopted between
1920 and 1945, which merely authorized the issuance of rules, or which
called for the promulgation of rules but left to the issuing agency the
procedure to be followed. 1' These, the critics must note, were few in
number and by no means representative of legislative action during this
period, for an examination of the session laws will reveal a far greater
number of acts that conferred legislative powers and required that the
rules in force be publicized in accordance with procedures set down in
the statutes." s
Two of these laws (highway commission act, 1941, and milk control
board act of 1935) contained a provision not found in the others: when
properly posted the rules of these agencies were to be judicially noticed
and have the force and effect of law, a provision that was not necessary
135. 206 Ind. 626, 190 N.E. 853 (1934).
136. 111 Ind. 472, 11 N.E. 605 (1887).
137. See e.g., acts establishing seed commissioner, 1921 Ind. Laws ch. 28; state
veterinarian, 1925 Ind. Laws ch. 7; commissioner on weights and measures, IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 67-601-27 (Burns 1961); and department of commerce and industries, 1935
Ind. Laws ch. 265.
138. Expediency and space permit only brief references to the more favorable
accomplishments of this period. Four acts pertaining to public health: 1935 Ind. Laws,
ch. 214; 1939 Ind. Laws ch. 38; 1941 Ind. Laws ch. 225; 1943 Ind. Laws ch. 264;
livestock sanitary board, 1943 Ind. Laws ch. 85; milk control board, 1935 Ind. Laws
ch. 281; egg boad, 1939 Ind. Laws ch. 117; but cf. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 35-2251-66(Burns 1949); barber examiners, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 63-301-25 (Burns 1961); com-
mittee on safety, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 47-1701-10 (Burns 1952).
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in view of the court's frequent rulings on this matter ;139 yet it did appear
as a significant additional requirement in the 1927 state fire marshal
act,14 and one which the Indiana Supreme Court considered in rendering
its decision in Tozun of Kirklin v. Evermanr. '4
In 1927 the state fire marshal was authorized to issue rules for the
purpose of preventing fires and promoting public safety. Such rules were
to be enforced "by order thereon as is provided for the enforcement of
orders of the state fire marshal."' 42 This meant, according to the pertinent
section in the statute, that the rules would enter into force only if the
parties affected were given notice, and an opportunity for a court hearing
and review had been provided. But confusion arises from the provisions
of this law. An order might be issued in a specific situation in which
a fire hazard exists, whereas rules apply generally to matters of preventing
fires and protecting life and property. This point may be noted in the
context of the court case. In question was a regulation which required
that gasoline storage tanks be located below the surface of the ground in
specified manner. '4 If the law were strictly followed, each assistant
fire marshal would have to examine storage tanks within his jurisdiction,
and if he found tanks not constructed in accordance with the regulation,
a proceeding as outlined in the statute would have to be initiated.
Apparently the lower court overlooked this provision, or possibly it
failed to determine whether the regulation had been properly issued, for
the trial court judge stated in his charge to the jury that this regulation
was "the law of this state," an instruction which the Supreme Court
regarded as "clearly erroneous." 4  The upper court distinguished this
law from others which delegated quasi-legislative powers on the grounds
of the specific requirement pertaining to enforcement. Thus, in holding
that there had to be notice and an opportunity for a judicial hearing on
and review of the regulation, the judges were in effect saying that the
fire marshal's rules could take on the characteristics of rules of other
agencies only after the statutory requirements had been fulfilled. It
did not mean that the court was demanding the inclusion of procedural
139. Blue v. Beach, 155 Ind. 121, 56 N.E. 89 (1900) ; Wallace v. Dohner, 89 Ind. App.
416, 165 N.E. 552 (1929) ; Coleman v. City of Gary, 220 Ind. 446, 44 N.E.2d 101 (1942) ;
and see 1953 OPs. IND. ATr'Y GEN. 213. State Senator Bontrager stated to the writer,
"Frankly, however, I have always rebelled against giving those agencies the power to
make rules and regulations which shall have the force and effect of law." Letter dated
July 27, 1959.
140. IND. ANN. STAT. § 20-807 (Burns 1950).
141. 217 Ind. 683, 29 N.E.2d 206 (1940).
142. IND. ANN. STAT. § 20-807 (Burns 1950).
143. Town of Kirklin v. Everman, 217 Ind. 683, 29 N.E.2d 206 Z1940).
144. Ibid.
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requirements; it did mean that the court would compel agencies to abide
by those requirements set forth in the statutes.
The railway commission, public service commission, and fire marshal
acts were forerunners of other legislation having stringent procedural
requirements. Some other agencies were brought under similar require-
ments, notably the public health board, an agency long governed by laws
with little in the way of procedural safeguards and one which seemed
to operate with unlimited power even with respect to the substance of its
rules, and this despite the court's claim that judicial tests of the agency's
rules could be expected.' 45
Substantial progress was made in health board laws toward goals
similar to those of the reformers. As though in response to the outcry
for reform in the 1930's the General Assembly prescribed the procedures
for issuing rules in the 1939 pure food law, including public participation
in the rule making process."' Appropriate notice had to be given at least
thirty days prior to the hearing date, and those affected were to be
advised about the proposed rules and the time and place of the hearings.
There was also provision for amending or repealing rules, the board
being required to follow the same procedure as for adoption:
except that in the case of a regulation amending or repealing any
such regulation of the board, to such an extent as it deems
necessary in order to prevent undue hardship, may disregard the
the foregoing provisions regarding notice, hearing, or effective
date.""
Possibly the next General Assembly regarded this provisio as vesting too
great a discretion in the board, for the 1941 milk inspection act did not
include exceptional situations. And the 1943 act empowering the health
board to regulate food locker plants largely followed the two just dis-
cussed, except that no reference was made to amending or repealing
procedures. 48
Equally significant with regard to procedures were the laws of the
1930's establishing the division of labor and the unemployment compensa-
tion division. 4' Under the division of labor act of 1937 important safe-
guards were established, though there might be objection to the language
145. See especially Lake Erie Ry. v. James, 10 Ind. App. 550, 35 N.E. 395 (1894) ;
Blue v. Beach, 155 Ind. 121, 56 N.E. 89 (1900) ; Horne v. Beil, 157 Ind. 25, 60 N.E. 672
(1901); Isenhour v. State, 157 Ind. 517, 62 N.E. 40 (1901); Vonnegut v. Baun, 206
Ind. 172, 188 N.E. 677 (1934).
146. 1939 Ind. Laws ch. 38.
147. 1939 Ind. Laws ch. 38, § 26.
148. 1941 Ind. Laws ch. 225, § 4.
149. 1936 Ind. Laws. ch. 4.
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used. Some words suggested that these measures depended largely upon
the commissioner for fulfillment. For example, he was authorized to col-
lect and publish the rules if he believed that the statute's purposes would
be advanced thereby.' More definitive was the statutory right to petition
the commissioner for a modification of a rule which caused practical
difficulty or undue hardship. The commissioner was required to hold a
public hearing to determine whether modification seemed to be de-
manded. 5' Interested parties were also given the right to request from
the agency "a review of the validity or reasonableness of any rule," with
the procedures for such action stipulated in the act. Provisions of this
law seemed to contradict each other in that, on the one hand, much
discretion was vested in the commissioner, whose answer to the petition
was to be final and conclusive; but, on the other hand, there was a
statutory provision for judicial review.'52
Certain other statutes of this period are in sharp contrast and must
be stamped as inferior when measured by the reformers' standards, for
rule making powers were not surrounded by procedural safeguards.
While other sub-legislative powers were to be exercised according to
statutory procedures, there is nothing in these several statutes that
suggests, nor does the court give us reason to believe, that these limitations
extended to the issuance of rules.
In 1933 the department of financial institutions was authorized
to issue, alter, amend, and repeal rules.'53 Although the stated purposes
for which rules were to be issued may have provided adequate guidance,
this act, and the amendments of 1935 and 1945"" did not prescribe
methods for adopting rules. Under the small loan act of 1933 the depart-
ment was empowered to issue rules "for the proper conduct of such busi-
ness and the enforcement of this act."'55 The failure to prescribe pro-
cedures in the exercise of the rule making power becomes more apparent
in the examination of other "ministerial" functions,' which, as the
court pointed to on several occasions, could only be exercised in accord-
ance with statutory requirements; but nowhere did it suggest that the
rule making power was to be conducted in accordance with similar pro-
cedures. Nor did the judges claim that prescribed procedures were
150. 1937 Ind. Laws ch. 34, § 9(6).
151. Ibid.
152. Ibid.
153. IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-207 (Burns 1950).
154. IND. ANiN. STAT. §§ 18-103-2171 (Burns 1950).
155. IND. ANN. STAT. § 18-103 (Burns 1950).
156. By "ministerial" functions the court meant licensing and rate making. See
Financial Aid Corp v. Wallace, 216 Ind. 114, 23 N.E.2d 472 (1939).
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essential to due process. Indeed, they rejected an argument of this nature
in stating:
The standard is as definite and certain as the Legislature could
fix by a general statute. An administrative officer charged with
the administration of the laws enacted by the General Assembly
necessarily exercises a discretion partaking of the characteristics
of the judicial department of the government but does not have
the force and effect of a judgment. Unless an administrative
officer or department is permitted to make reasonable rules and
regulations, it would be impossible in many instances to apply
and enforce the legislative enactments, and the good to be ac-
complished would be entirely lost."'
There are more questions suggested than answers given in this statement.
Twice within the same paragraph the court referred to definite standards.
But immediately after the first such reference the court pointed to the
statutory requirements for "a full and careful investigation" before
fixing interest rates, and "a full and complete hearing" prefatory to
acting on license requests. If these were the definite standards found
by the court what about the rule making powers? Second, the court
treated licensing, rate setting, and rule making as part of the same thing,
the administrative duties of the agency. But the court did not state
whether agency discretion in exercising the rule making power is also
in the nature of one "partaking of the characteristics of the judicial de-
partment of government," thus whether procedural due process was
denied in the absence of fixed statutory methods.
Statutory methods for exercising some sub-legislative functions, but
not rule making, were characteristic of the laws of the department of
financial institutions and the insurance and securities commissions.'
There were these situations; and there was also a general improvement
through the years, although not one that would suggest a more reasoned
and systematic treatment of procedural matters during successive sessions
of the General Assembly. In view of the irregularity in the development
it is unlikely that the General Assembly would have reached the same
goals by piecemeal legislation that presumably were reached under the
1945 act.
157. Id. at 121.
158. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 18-3101-25, 3201-38 (Burns 1950); 1933 Ind. Laws ch.
148-49; IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 39-3201-03, 3301-31 (Burns 1952) ; 1937 Ind. Laws ch. 120.
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4. DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1945
A more strict judicial examination of the substance of rules was
evident in 1944 and 1945 when the supreme court declared void a town
ordinance 9 and an agency action80 on the grounds that the issuing
agencies went beyond powers conferred in the statutes. These two de-
cisions might be distinguished as harbingers of the somewhat more strict
judicial attitude. A question about an agency operating beyond the
authority of the law was presented in Illinois Central R.R. v. Public
Service Comm'n, '6 wherein the appellant challenged the agency's order
that it restore train services. At issue was a rule adopted in 1937
requiring that each railroad company follow a certain procedure before
discontinuing intrastate trains. The court upheld the rule, concluding
that the act gave the commission the necessary authority to promulgate
rules of orderly procedure.'62
The act in question had used such terms as "to adopt all necessary
rules and regulations to govern . . . train service and accommodations,"
and "adopt and enforce such rules, regulations and modes of procedure
as it may deem proper to hear and determine complaints" in conferring
powers on the commission. Presumably this act provided a suitable
standard, although there is a suggestion in the court's language that it
had to consider the commission's responsibilities as well as the words
of the statute. 63 Why this situation should differ from that involving an
ordinance prescribing maximum speeds within a town's limits 64 seems
a reasonable question to ask, and especially when a somewhat similar
question is posed in Standard Oil Co. v. Review Board. 5
The latter question arose from the "good cause" proviso of this
state's unemployment compensation act. Standard Oil objected to the
payment of unemployment benefits to sixteen women who left work
voluntarily to marry. There seemed to be good reason for this objection,
section 1507 of the act having explicitly forbidden payment of benefits
in such instances; but a proviso to that section authorized annulments
of this policy in individual cases upon showing a "good cause" by the
claimant.
159. Southern Ry. v. Harpe, 223 Ind. 124, 58 N.E.2d 346 (1944).
160. McCreery v. Ijams, 115 Ind. App. 631, 59 N.E.2d 133 (1945).
161. 225 Ind. 643, 75 N.E.2d 900 (1947).
162. Id. at 647.
163. The court's decision in Illinois Central was in accord with earlier decisions
wherein statutory standards were liberally construed when the public interest was
involved. See Albert v. Milk Control Board, 210 Ind. 283, 200 N.E. 688 (1936).
164. Southern Ry. v. Harpe, 223 Ind. 124, 58 N.E.2d 346 (1944).
165. 230 Ind. 1, 101 N.E.2d 60 (1951).
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In answering the question whether this was an unwarranted delega-
tion of legislative power, the courst stated that the legislature had to lay
down a standard "as definitely described as is reasonably practicable."
The court could not find such a standard in the present law, nor did it
find a definition of the proviso. 6 In the court's estimation the choice
was left to the unbounded discretion of the agency. "The Board may
find the facts, but, having found them is without any legal yardstick by
which to measure the rights of parties."' 67 The provision in question
was held unconstitutional, with the court suggesting the need for drafting
a statute "which would not leave to the Review Board the legislative
power of choice."'69
The rule that reasonable standards had to be included in the statutes
was reaffirmed by decisions in 1952... and 1958.17 But in the latter case
the court qualified this by saying:
However, the policy of the Legislature and the standards to
guide the administrative agency may be laid down in very broad
and general terms. Such terms get precision from the knowl-
edge and experience of men whose duty it is to administer the
statutes, and then such statutes become reasonably certain
guides in carrying out the will and intent of the Legislature.'
Why this was not true in the Standard Oil case is not apparent in the
court's discussions. There is a contradiction that is not explained by the
court's claim that this and other jurisdictions "are less strict in requiring
specific standards" in statutes designed to protect the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare." 2 The general welfare was the stated policy
of the compensation act, and public safety, through regulating the sale
of firearms, was the aim of the statute in question in the Matthews case.
Yet they were not accorded the same status by the court. Apparently the
court meant that it would be less likely to demand elaborate standards
for protecting public health or safety than for protecting the general
welfare.
During the same term in which Matthews was decided the court
heard objections to a 1915 act which empowered the public service com-
166. Note, Good Cause Proviso in Unemployment Compensation Statute Held
Unconstitutional Delegation, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 284 (1952), claims that such provisos
appear in one form or another in all but one state unemployment compensation statute.
167. Standard Oil Co. v. Review Board, 230 Ind. 1, 9, 101 N.E.2d 60 (1951).
168. Ibid.; see Bezossi v. Indiana Employment Security Board, 237 Ind. 341, 346,
146 N.E.2d 100 (1957).
169. Ennis v. State Highway Comm'n, 231 Ind. 311, 108 N.E.2d 687 (1952).
170. Matthews v. Indiana, 237 Ind. 677, 148 N.E.2d 334 (1958).
171. Id. at 681-82.
172. Ibid.
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mission to require either a watchman or automatic signal at any obstructed
crossing. To the contention that this act did not contain a "proper stan-
dard" the court stated:
if the legislature can delegate to a board or commission the
fixing of a reasonable rate or charge, it is certainly difficult to
see why it may not delegate to the Public Service Commission
the function of determining what is or is not an obstructed
crossing under the particular facts.'
In the latter decision judicial notice was taken of the number of children,
adults, motor vehicles and bicycles crossing the tracks where the obstruc-
tion existed, thus giving weight to the idea that the public interest
demanded support and validation of the agency's order. But a mere policy
statement that the public interest was affected was not enough, as is
apparent in the Standard Oil Co. case, for the court had to have con-
vincing evidence that a matter was in the public interest.
The latter point is apparent in cases involving the department of
financial institutions and the insurance commissioner.'74 These cases
arose from efforts of the agencies to prevent automobile dealers from
selling automobile insurance. The first objection to such an attempt
was voiced by the Johnson Chevrolet Company, when it requested that
the department be permanently enjoined from enforcing section III of
its General Order No. 1.' In fixing the maximum participation of
retail sellers thereunder the department obviously believed that this was
its responsibility under the retail installment sales act.""G But the court
disagreed With this interpretation, for it could not find that the act
contemplated licensing insurance agents, nor the amount of compensation
that they could receive; nor could the court find legislative intent to keep
"people or corporations from engaging in both the insurance business"
173. N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 237 Ind. 544, 551, 147 N.E.2d 547
(1958).
174. Department of Financial Institutions v. Johnson Chevrolet Co., 228 Ind. 397,
92 N.E.2d 714 (1950) ; Department of Ins. v. Motors Ins. Corp., 236 Ind. 1, 138 N.E.2d
157 (1956) ; Department of Financial Institutions v. Holt, 231 Ind. 293, 108 N.E.2d 629
(1952); Department of Financial Institutions v. C. I. T. Credit Corp., 237 Ind. 404,
146 N.E.2d 93 (1957).
175. INDIANA RULES AND REGULATIONS 157 (1948 Additions & Revisions).
176.
No licensee shall enter into any agreement with any retail seller regarding the
purchase of any retail installment contract whereby the retail seller shall receive,
directly or indirectly, any benefit from or part of any amount collected or
received from any retail buyer, as a finance charge or as the cost of the insur-
ance to the retail buyer, in excess of an amount fixed and determined by the
Department ...
IND. ANN. STAT. § 58-910 (Burns 1948). This portion of the act was invalidated in
the Holt case, 231 Ind. 293, 108 N.E.2d 629 (1952).
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and automobile sales. The court concluded that the department's action
was "an arbitary invasion of private property and personal rights under
the guise of police power."' 1
77
Possibly the commissioner of insurance had this statement of the
court in mind when he set down twelve reasons why he was refusing to
license automobile dealers as agents and solicitors of insurance.7 8 This
he claimed to do in the exercise of his discretionary powers and in the
public interest. But neither claim influenced the court, for it stated, as it
did in the previous case, that it was not the intention of the legislature
to keep people from engaging in both businesses. 9
A limit on the police power was set by the court; the legislature
could not "authorize a public official to give or withhold arbitrarily or
capriciously, permission to pursue a lawful occupation or business,"180
and any sub-legislation issued was "bounded by the constitutional limita-
tions of the police power."""' That the court was not impressed with the
commissioner's twelve reasons was apparent in its statement that the
general public was not concerned with the matter of an automobile dealer
also being an insurance salesman, a claim first made in Department of
Financial Institutions v. Johnson Chevrolet.' In each case the court
ruled that the regulations were without statutory authority, and it rejected
the claims that they were issued in the public interest. Later the court
admitted that rig'hts may be limited by the police power ;..3 nevertheless,
it struck down both section 10 of the retail installment sales act and the
department's rule. The court said that they could not be supported as
valid exercises of the police power, since the interests of the buying
public were adequately protected against unfair and exhorbitant finance
charges by other provisions of the act."8
Agencies suffered other setbacks in the courts, but not by reason of
the 1945 act. In 1951 the appellate court and employment security
division came to entirely different conclusions on the meaning of an
177. Department of Financial Institutions v. Johnson Chevrolet Co., 228 Ind. 397,
406, 91 N.E.2d 643 (1950).
178. 236 Indiana Supreme Court Briefs 1, 13 (1956); Department of Ins. v.
Motors Ins. Corp., 236 Ind. 1, 7, 138 N.E.2d 157 (1956).
179. Department of Ins. v. Motors Ins. Corp., supra note 178.
180. Id. at 16, citing as authority Stern v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 154 N. Y. Supp.
283 (1915).
181. Department of Ins. v. Motors Ins. Corp., supra, note 178 at 7.
182. 228 Ind. 397, 92 N.E.2d 714 (1950).
183. 231 Ind. 293, 108 N.E.2d 629 (1952).
184. For a further discussion of these several cases see Note, Is Control of Dealer
Participation a Necessary Adjunct to Reg-lation of Installment Sales Financing, 28
IND. L.J. 641 (1953) ; also Hardy, Aiwther View on the Origin of Dealer Participation
in Automobile Finance Charges, 30 IND. L... 311 (1955) ; Pecar, Dealer Participation in
Automobile Finance Charges: A Reply, id. at 319 (1955).
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act. This was not an instance, the court said, in which the legislature
had stated a broad general policy then delegated to an administrative
agency the power to implement policy with rules and regulations. Rather
the legislature had provided a specific statutory yardstick which could
neither be broken nor shortened by administrative legislation." 5
In 1952 the supreme court heard two cases involving questions about
an agency operating beyond the law. Under the gross income tax law of
1933 the director was granted rule making powers."' From May 1933
to April 1946 the gross income tax division followed a department rule
which stated:
Taxpayers selling real property upon which there is a mortgage
lien will be deemed to be selling only an equity therein where the
mortgage lien is assumed by the purchaser, and only the amount
received in cash, notes or other property will be reported for
gross income tax.8 "
On April 27, 1946 Rule No. 3405 entered into force, providing:
If any mortgage existing on real property at the time of sale was
executed by the seller of such real estate as security for bor-
rowed money received by, or credited to, such seller, then no
deduction whatsoever may be taken by the seller, regardless of
whether the mortgage is assumed by the purchaser or a third
party; or satisfied by the seller with funds provided by the
purchaser or other parties.'
In these cases the court ruled that the department had gone beyond the
authorization of the law. Only the General Assembly could say what
income was subject to taxation, and it had "not said that a mortgage
interest in property is an asset to the mortgagor that is subject to assess-
ment for gross income tax."'8 9
The emphasis in these decisions was on the substance of administra-
tive rules, and the court's strict supervision of agency rule making after
1945 had nothing to do with the 1945 rule making act. Indeed, that
statute was overlooked in one case in which it might have been applied;
185. Employment Security Division v. Ponder, 121 Ind. App. 51, 92 N.E.2d 224
(1951).
186. IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-2629 (Burns 1961).
187. The rule was cited in Gross Income Tax Division v. Crown Development Co.,
231 Ind. 449, 461, 109 N.E.2d 426 (1952).
188. Ibid.
189. Ibid.; see Gross Income Tax Division v. Colpaert Realty, 231 Ind. 463, 109
N.E.2d 415 (1952).
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
it was of minor significance in another case, and ultimately was the
basis for only one decision.
The court might have invalidated an agency regulation in Depart-
ment of Insurance v. Motors Insurance Corp.9 on the grounds that the
commissioner had not complied with the provisions of the 1945 act.
However, for an obvious reason the court elected a different course of
action in striking down the rule in question. In a letter to the insurance
company the commissioner had set forth his twelve reasons for not
licensing automobile dealers as insurance agents. The court announced
that this letter was treated as a regulation by the insurance commissioner,
the company, and the trial court, and that it would be so regarded by the
supreme court.'' Yet there is nothing about this letter to suggest that
it was a regulation within the meaning of the 1945 act, and certainly it
was not adopted in comformity with the procedure stated in that law.
Obviously the court was preoccupied with the substance and aim of this
rule, and, by going to the heart of the matter, it could emphasize its
determination to block the efforts of the two state agencies to prevent
automobile dealers from selling insurance." 2
In State ex rel. Sights v. Edwards'9 ' the 1945 act played only a
minor role. Possibly its only significance to this study was the court's
going behind the published rule to discover that Rule No. 58 of the state
board of education had not been approved by the governor and attorney
general; consequently, it was inoperative.
The last decision for consideration is Blair v. Gettinger,9 the one
instance in which the 1945 rule making act gained serious attention.
This case arose from an apparent contradiction between a properly adopted
and published rule and a practice of the commission on teacher licensing.
Certain rules governing teacher certification had been issued by the
commission, including one which provided for a general elementary
certificate. Prior to the time of the issuance of this rule certificates were
issued for specific grade levels from kindergarten through the eighth
grade. The question for the court was whether the appellant was licensed
to teach in the primary grades, her certificate being for those at the
intermediate level. From the description of Blair's license it was obvious
that she was not certified to teach the primary grades, nor could she
190. 236 Ind. 1, 138 N.E.2d 157 (1957).
191. Id. at 9.
192. Department of Financial Institutions v. Johnson Chevrolet Co., 228 Ind. 397,
92 N.E.2d 714 (1950) ; Department of Financial Institutions v. Holt, 231 Ind. 293, 108
N.E.2d 629 (1952).
193. 228 Ind. 13, 88 N.E.2d 763 (1949).
194. 230 Ind. 588, 105 N.E.2d 161 (1952).
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qualify for a general certificate under Rule No. 14.195 Blair insisted
that hers was a valid general certificate, for at the commission's meeting
in April 1950:
[the] question was raised as to whether the Division might con-
tinue the practice of accepting any elementary license as valid
for teaching in grades one through eight. Dr. Maxam moved
that such an interpretation be accepted indefinitely as a policy
of the Commission. Mr. Morehead seconded the motion and it
was carried. 9
It thus appeared that the commission had been accepting as a matter of
practice any elementary license as valid for teaching grades one through
eight. While the court admitted that when there was a doubt as to the
meaning of a rule, the agency's interpretation of it would "have much
weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the rule itself,"'97
it could not see such doubt in the present rule, and did not need to look
to the agency's construction of it.'
Of significance was the court's further statement that rights or
benefits arising under rules could "not be extended by interpretation
beyond the plain terms of the rule itself," for to do so:
would be to create rules by interpretation thus defeating the
legislative requirement that rules may be adopted only by com-
pliance with required formalities such as publication of notice
and a hearing and the approval of the attorney general and gov-
ernor as required by Ch. 120 of the Acts of 1945.'
Rule making laws adopted since 1945 fall into three categories,
according to rule making provisions. The first category includes laws
which authorize the issuance of rules and regulations and demand that the
procedure be "in the manner as provided by law," or, in a more specific
reference to the uniform rule making act, be in accordance with the
"statutes [sic] of this state concerning the establishment of rules. 20
195. INDIANA RULES AND REGULATIONS 262 (1949 Additions & Revisions). This
rule pertained only to those -',ho entered teacher training after September 1946, and
she had been teaching for twenty years.
196. Appellant's exhibit No. 4, a minute of the meeting. Blair v. Gettinger, 230 Ind.
588, 601, 105 N.E.2d 161 (1952).
197. Id. at 602; and citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock and Sand Co., 325 U.S. 440
(1955).
198. The court found support in Brown Lumber Co. v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 299 U.S. 383 (1936).
199. Blair v. Gettinger, 230 Ind. 588, 602, 105 N.E.2d 161 (1952).
200. These include: (1) regulation of nursing, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 63-901-29
(Bums 1961) ; (2) public health code, IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-101 (Burns 1949); (3)
dental examiners board, IND. ANN. STAT. § 63-502 (Burnes 1961 Supp.); (4) state
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Laws in the second category are those which appear to alter or
modify in some way the procedural and informational requirements of
the administrative rule making act as they apply to specific agencies, yet
leave open the question whether this was the actual intent of the legis-
lature. In 1947 an amended livestock sanitary board act provided for
approval of rules by a majority of the board and state attorney general,
yet made no reference to the governor.2"' The publication requirement
was identical to that in the 1943 act, suggesting that the initiators did not
refer to the 1945 act. But this section was specifically repealed in 1951,
with the board instructed to adopt, revise, or repeal rules in accordance
with the administrative rule making act. 2 '
The notice and hearing requirements of the 1945 act were disre-
garded by the authors of a 1953 law regulating the sale and distribution
of fertilizers20 3 and one in 1957 regulating the sale of vegetable seeds.0
And the laws of 1959 creating airport authority districts20 5 and levee
authority districts20. prescribed methods for the adoption of sub-legisla-
tion different from those prescribed in the uniform rule making act.
These laws which prescribe procedures other than those of the 1945
act are not as numerous as those in the third category. Embraced within
this latter group are acts which confer rule making powers in language
essentially the same as that of the earlier laws; they neither refer to the
uniform rule making act, nor do they impose limitations on the exercise
of sub-legislative powers which represent significant departures from,
or innovations in, such statutory grants.0 '
board of health, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 35-3603-10 (Burns 1949); (5) livestock sanitary
board, 1951 Ind. Laws ch. 80; (6) regulation of mobile homes, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 35-
2841-81 (Burns 1961 Supp.) ; (7) regulation, sale and distribution of commercial feeds,
INn. ANN. STAT. §§ 16-1012-26 (Burns 1961 Supp.) ; (8) regulation and inspection of
nursing homes, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 42-1448-64 (Burns 1961 Supp.) ; (9) control of
radiation, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 35-4501-21 (Burns 1961 Supp.) ; (10) livestock licensing,
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 42-925-37 (Burns 1961 Supp.) ; (11) taxing motor vehicles, 1959
Ind. Acts, ch. 384; and (12) veterinary medicine licensing, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 16-1431-56
(Burns 1961 Supp.).
201. IN . ANN. STAT. §§ 54-511-12 (Burns 1951).
202. IND. ANN. STAT. § 16-1201 (Burns 1961 Supp.).
203. Ixn. ANN. STAT. §§ 15-1007-22 (Burns 1961 Supp.).
204. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 15-825-38 (Bums 1961 Supp.).
205. IND. ANN. STAT. §3 14-1201-35 (Bums 1961 Supp.).
206. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 27-1001-33 (Burns 1960).
207. Included are laws pertaining to: (1) fire marshall, IND. ANN. STAT. § 20-807
(Burns 1950) ; (2) licensing of nursing homes, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 42-1418-47 (Burns
1952); (3) unemployment compensation, IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1525-63 (Burns 1950);
(4) oil and gas inspection, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 46-1701-27 (Bums 1952) ; (5) embalmer's
board, IN n. ANN. STAT. §§ 63-719-30 (Burns 1961); (6) financial institutions, IND.
ANN. STAT. §§18-705, 1103, 2105, 2109, 2123-25, 3001, 3404, 3407-11, 3416 (Burns 1961
Supp.); (7) division of safety, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 47-1046-48, 1052, 1074, 1081-83, 1087
(Burns 1952) ; (8) small loans licensing, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 18-3001-04 (Burns 1961
Supp.); (9) regulation of mining, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 46-1502-11 (Burns 1952) ; (10)
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More than thirty laws fall within the third category. They do not, of
course, pose any special problem, since it may be assumed that the 1945
act is applicable. If any problem is presented it is with regard to those
regulatory laws which prescribe procedures other than those of the rule
making act. It is as though the legislators were neither cognizant of the
long struggle for procedural reform nor aware of the 1945 act. If the
legislators and other public officials disregard the 1945 act and its stated
goals, what hope may be held out for the new reform measure?
5. SOME COMMENTARIES ON RULE MAKING IN INDIANA
AND THE REFORM PROPOSAL
Events of the last few years in Indiana and elsewhere demonstrate
a continuing dissatisfaction with practices related to administrative rule
making. Yet it would not be correct to say that all who look favorably
upon recent reform proposals fall within the same camp, for, as deter-
mined by Ferrel Heady, they "may be divided into three groups on the
basis of their attitudes toward the earlier settlement represented by the
1946 APA and its state counterparts." ' The first group is comprised
of liberals and ex-New Dealers who have been disillusioned with govern-
ment in the past decade and especially concerned with encroachments
upon the rights of the individual.0 9 Professor Schwartz probably
speaks for the second group of the new reformers. Their philosophy is
described by Heady as "building block" or "gradualist." 10 They claim
that it is time to carry reform forward with the establishment of legisla-
tive control of administrative rules and regulations. "We wuz robbed"
seems to describe best the attitude of the third group, men who believe
that the accomplishments of the uniform procedure acts have been
"whittled away and eroded" in frequent skirmishes. 11
financial institutions, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 19-2201-06 (Burns 1961 Supp.) ; (11) aero-
nautics commission, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 14-327-41, 1101-09 (Burns 1961 Supp.) ; (12)
board of health, IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-3609, §§ 35-4214-28, 2801-21 (Burns 1961 Supp.) ;
(13) sale of checks and money orders, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 18-3401-17 (Burns 1961
Supp.) ; (14) department of insurence, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 39-3501, 3007-09, 3015, 3018-
19, 3024, 3026 (Bums 1961 Supp.) ; (15) board of pharmacy, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 63-
1213-26 (Burns 1961); (16) regulation of chartered vehicles, IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1229
(Burns 1961 Supp.); (17) department of conservation, IND. ANN. STAT. § 11-1524,
§§ 68-1101-10 (Burns 1961; (18) regulation of ferry boats, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 36-2506-
12 (Burns 1961 Supp.) ; (19) board of tax commissioners, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 64-535-39
(Burns 1961) ; (20) boiler inspection, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 20-634-58 (Burns 1961 Supp.).
208. Heady, The New Reform Movement in Regudatory Administration, 19 Pun.
ADMIN. REv. 89, 92 (1959).
209. Fuchs, The Proposed New Code of Administrative Procedure, 19 OHIo ST.
L.J. 423 (1958).
210. Heady, supra note 208.
211. Symposium: Proposed Changes in Federal Administrative Practice and Pro-
cedure, 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 377 (1958), Foreword by Charles S. Rhyne.
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Indiana's current reformers are within the Schwartz camp. They
provided the leadership in 1959 and 1961 for the creation of a legislative
oversight committee to review all administrative rules. Schwartz be-
lieves that truly effective controls are possible only if the work of the
courts is supplemented by legislative oversight:
The Congress is the one great organ of government that is
both responsible to the electorate and independent of the execu-
tive. As the source of delegations of administrative power, it
must also exercise direct responsibility over the manner in
which such power is employed.212
In support of this proposal Professor Schwartz points to the experiences
in the United Kingdom and several American states where such controls
are in effect.21
In 1959 the Indiana Senate moved in the direction of this new reform
with the adoption of Concurrent Resolution No. 9. This provided for
an interim committee to consider "the feasibility of amending chapter
120 of the Acts of the Indiana General Assembly of 1945 to require the
approval of all rules and regulations by the [legislative advisory] commis-
sion as a necessary part of the process of promulgation." '214 Statements
by Senators Bainbridge and Bontrager leave no question as to why the
legislature wants its own members to approve administrative rules and
regulations before they may take effect. Senator Bainbridge believes
that the legislators have abdicated from their responsibilities in delegating
so much of their authority to state agencies ;215 and Senator Bontrager
states:
My reason for joining with Senator Spurgeon in the authorship
of Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 9 was that I frequently,
as a lawyer, come in contact with regulations promulgated by
administrative agencies which seem to me to encroach rather
heavily upon the rights of individual citizens. I have realized,
212. Schwartz, Lcgislative Oversight: Control of Administrative Agencies, 43
A.B.A.J. 19, 20 (1957).
213. Carr & Schwartz, Legislative Control of Administrative Rides and Regulations,
30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1031 (1955). Statutory provisions for such control may be seen:
NED. RE V. STAT. § 84-904 (1958); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 77-410 (1949) ; VA. CODE
ANN. § 9-6.9 (1956) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.041 (1957). Wisconsin's experience with
legislative oversight is described: Boles, The Post-Hearing Stage of the Administrative
Rule Making Process in Wisconsin: The Conservation. Commission, 40 MARQ. L. REV.
251 (1956).
214. 1959 Ind. Acts ch. 403, § 2. On August 4, 1959 a bipartisan committee was
appointed by Lt. Governor Parker and Speaker Bayh. Senator Martin served as chair-
man and Representative Kent as vice-chairman.
215. Interview in Indianapolis, July 16, 1959.
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of course, that it probably is necessary for the Legislature to
give administrative agencies and bureaus some powers with
regard to the promulgation of rules and regulations. Frankly,
however, I have always rebelled against giving those agencies
the power to make rules and regulations which shall have the
force and effect of law.216
The statements of these two legislators imply that we have moved some
distance from the ideas of responsibility and responsiveness to the people.
Their statements also explain Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 9 and
why Senate Enrolled Act No. 58, an act providing for legislative over-
sight, was drafted and passed in 1961. This was pocket vetoed by
Governor Welsh, thereby delaying until the 1963 session a final answer
to the question about further reform. Meanwhile certain questions about
practices since 1945 and the proposed legislative oversight demand
answers.
First we should consider whether the legislature should not con-
centrate its efforts in improving the situation under the 1945 act. There
is no check to determine whether agencies actually comply with the pro-
visions of the 1945 rule making law, and there is some evidence that the
law is frequently evaded. Professor Kirk, who was recently engaged
in codifying Indiana's school laws, found that agencies publish amend-
ments to existing rules, but the citations are to agency pamphlets rather
than the cumulative publication of the secretary of state, thus making
it difficult to find the rules. 17 Mrs. Kay Cleveland, the former chief
clerk in the office of secretary of state, had also stated that agencies do
not follow faithfully and carefully the law's stipulations.1 '
Substance for these claims is found in a number of examples.
Previously we noted the court's statement in Department of Insurance
v. Motors Insurance Corp. that the commissioner's letter would be treated
as an administrative regulation, despite the fact that this was not such
under the 1945 act. If the commissioner treated this as a regulation, has
he issued others which do not meet the requirements of the 1945 act, but
which have not been brought to the attention of the court? An examina-
tion of the cumulative volumes of rules since 1947 and a spot check of
agencies would reveal how many rules have been issued contrary to the
1945 law.
Questions may also be raised about the accuracy of handling rules
and regulations. An example in point is Rule No. 58 of the state board
216. Letter to writer, July 27, 1959.
217. The writer discussed matters pertinent to this study with Professor Kirk.
218. Response to questionnaire, October 1958.
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of education, one which was published by the secretary of state, even
though it had not been approved by the governor and attorney general.
Obviously this caused some confusion to the appellant in Sights v.
Edwards, she believing that was a valid rule.219 Another case in point is
a 1955 rule adopted by the department of insurance. Both the proposed
rule and the rule as adopted carry the notation, "Effective June 30,
1955." But in several places in the rule as proposed and as adopted there
is notice that a hearing was to be held, and was held, on July 25, 1955.
There is also the notation that the rule was filed with the secretary of
state on September 1, 1955.22 According to the rule making act rules
are "effective as of the date and time filed with the secretary of state."
221
We thus find a unique situation in which the rule took effect almost
a month before the hearing and two months before it was filed.
Most agencies seem to be careful in numbering rules so that inter-
ested parties may readily locate them. This has largely been true of the
veterans affairs commission, although some confusion arises from the
fact that it has two different sets of rules numbered from one through
seven, and they are in no way related to each other. 2
\"Thile there are these agency failures to be noted, we cannot assume
that they are typical, or that these critical comments tell the whole story.
There are those who look favorably upon developments since 1945, and
there is evidence to support the claims that they make. Mr. Robert
Iollowell, who, as one of the chief architects of the rule making act, has
both a personal and professional interest in the results, believes that
agencies in general have followed faithfully the provisions of the law.
He suggests that any exceptions that are found arise from changes in
administration and a lack of familiarity with the law, "rather than from
any desire upon the part of any administrative agency to deliberately
ignore or circumvent them."2 To anyone familiar with Indiana politics
this is a reasonable explanation. The election of a new officeholder
usually results in a complete change of personnel, continuity not being
one of the characteristics of Indiana's bureaucracy.
But, while this point is well taken, and while it is sound to be
realistic, the question must be asked whether it would not be equally
realistic to ensure conformity with a law that is regarded as a significant
219. 228 Ind. 13, 88 N.E.2d 763 (1950).
220. INDIANA RULES AND REGULATIONS 124 (1956 Additions & Revisions).
221. IND. ANN. STAT. § 60-1505 (Burns 1961).
222. The first seven rules were adopted in August 1945, providing for the employ-
ment of veterans as district, county and/or city service officers, 2 INDIANA RULES AND
REGULATIONS 1935 (1947); the second set deals with the veteran's bonus, INDIANA
RULES AND REGULATIONS 159 (1950 Additions & Revisions).
223. Letter to writer, October 24, 1958.
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safeguard for the people. The earlier reformers demanded that we not
lose sight of historic American notions; and their claims that such
principles as the rule of law and certainty in the law were being over-
shadowed by the emphasis on effectiveness of government were not with-
out justification. It is thus empirically sound to provide certain safe-
guards in the laws, and it is not unwise to take advantage of a single rule
making act, such as that of 1945, thereby accomplishing with one stroke
what would otherwise obtain only under a host of acts.
Whether Indiana should embark upon a further reform program
depends on certain matters, not the least of which is gubernatorial opposi-
tion to a reform such as that envisaged in Senate Enrolled Act No. 58.
Reform-minded legislators should consider the objections which were
voiced by Governor Matthew E. Welsh:
This bill was pocket vetoed because it seems to me that for
the legislature to be reviewing proposed rules would unduly
complicate the administration of government. Under present
law public hearings must be held before any rules are adopted,
after which they must be approved by the attorney general as
to form and legality before they become effective.
The bill in question proposed a 60 day waiting period
before such regulations would become effective, which could
mean at least that much delay in a matter where time is usually
important.
Governor Welsh also questioned legislative review of the regulations of
the executive branch, believing that this violates, the principle of separ-
ation of powers; and he questioned "the wisdom of giving a veto power to
a small committee acting by itself while the legislature is not in session. 224
Possibly individual legislators will find answers to these objections
in advance of the 1963 session of the General Assembly. But members of
the legislature should also consider certain other points if they intend
to pursue this line of reform.
The legislators should know what Indiana's experiences tell us with
regard to further reform. Procedural due process has not been an
important issue in rule making cases since 1945, for the persons affected
are more concerned with the substance of the rules. It should also be
noted that very few administrative rules are challenged in the courts;
a matter which becomes significant when we consider the number of
rule making agencies and the number of rules issued annually. There is
thus no significant loss of motion in nor obstruction of the administrative
224. Letter to writer, August 4, 1961.
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process either with or without such procedural safeguards as those found
in the 1945 act.
The first finding stated above might lend support to a reform
measure such as legislative oversight. If substantive rather than pro-
cedural considerations are more important to private parties affected by
sub-legislation, legislative oversight would place the emphasis where it
properly belongs. This presumes, of course, as have some Hoosier
legislators, that administrative rules generally do not conform to policies
laid down in the statutes. Such a presumption underlies both the 1959
Senate resolution and the legislative oversight bill adopted in 1961.
However, a presumptive of this nature fails to take into account the roles
of the governor and attorney general, and the highly political character of
some of this state's more important administrative agencies. There is also
the question whether legislative oversight is realistic in view of the
institutional arrangements and the relative roles of the governor and
legislature in Indiana. A reform proposal such as this demands examina-
tion in light of such matters.
The governor is the state's chief administrative officer both in name
and fact. He exercises appointing and removal powers which, according
to Tucker v. State, ' inhere in his office and may not be removed by
legislative fiat. In rendering this decision the Indiana court followed
Meyers v. United States2 6 rather than Humphrey's Executor v. United
States,22' despite the closer parallel of United States independent regula-
tory commissions to state administrative agencies than a postmaster. In
effect, then, the Indiana Supreme Court looked to unity within the
executive-administrative branch, with the governor at the apex, a position
not permitted to the President of the United States so long as there is a
"headless forth branch."
The governor's obvious implication in the policy-making by the
several agencies may be demonstrated by such recent examples as the
public service commission's role in the struggle between the Indiana
Public Service Company and Rural Electrification Membership Corpora-
tion during the crucial 1958 senatorial campaign, or Governor Handley's
firing of three members of the department of financial institutions in
December 1959, when they refused to go along with his policy of raising
interest rates on bank deposits. The political overtones of such incidents
emphasize the role of the governor in administrative action, a role that is
not contingent upon the statutory requirements that he approve all rules
225. 218 Ind. 614, 35 N.E.2d 270 (1941).
226. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
227. 295 U.S. 603 (1935).
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and regulations before they may enter into force. Could legislative over-
sight provide a more effective check upon administrative agencies to
determine whether their rules conform to public policies as stated in the
statutes? Possibly at most this new role for the legislature would mean
an added dimension when, as occasionally happens in Indiana, the execu-
tive and legislative branches are not under the control of the same
political party.
Legislative oversight might do little more than raise false hopes;
it might do no more than add to the number of public hearings without
resulting in any significant action on the part of those legislators charged
with the duty of supervising agency rule making. It seems reasonable
to state again that hearings are presently required by law, and to suggest
another hearing (which might have been held by a committee of the
General Assembly in the absence of a proper administrative agency) means
little more than transferring to a different forum and one that is not
devoid of political implications nor divorced from politically inspired
decisions. Perhaps it is here that we should recall the points made by
Senators Bontrager and Bainbridge regarding the legislature's abdication
from its responsibility in delegating so much of its authority to admini-
strative agencies. In view of the emphasis that we place on responsibility
in a society claiming a representative system of government, this is
indeed a serious matter and one demanding attention.
There is an obvious need to keep in focus demands for responsible
government and effective government. Both matters merit consideration
in view of the enlargement of the functions and services of government
in the past 100 years and the constant emphasis on specialization. No
student of government and politics could entertain seriously the notion
that these developments may be reversed, or even that the trend may be
stopped. Certainly such suggestions are not made by the reformers,
for they obviously accept the permanence of the present arrangement
whereby the General Assembly frames public policy and leaves to admini-
strative agencies the responsibility for filling in the detail with appropriate
rules and regulations. However, mere acceptance of what is a reality
does not make more realistic their proposal nor more sound the purposes
of their proposal. Administrative responsibility is no more assured under
a system of legislative oversight than at present under executive oversight.
Indeed, in view of the governor's roles as chief executive, chief admini-
strative officer, and political leader of this state (roles which, incident-
ally, are not diminished even near the end of his constitutionally-limited
one term, a fact demonstrated in Governor Handley's successful bargain-
ing with his veto power when the 1959 General Assembly threatened to
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play havoc with the appropriation bill), one may question whether there is
not a greater assurance of administrative responsibility under executive
oversight than might be obtained under legislative oversight.
Even in the absence of a strong chief executive office there would
be no reason to believe that the Indiana General Assembly could operate
in such a way that administrative responsibility would be guaranteed.
Legislative bodies are representative in terms of population and terri-
torial units, not functionally. There is thus no reason to believe that law-
makers could do more than operate on the advice and recommendations
of specialists in each field-as they do now and have for so long a time.
In some instances, such as the point system used in suspending drivers'
licenses, the legislature could act directly, this not being a complex matter
demanding a degree of specialization. But what knowledge and experi-
ence may the typical legislator bring to bear on rules adopted by highly
technical or specialized agencies? How, for example, would legislators
cope with the problems of public health that are presently handled by
experts on such matters? A likely answer is that a legislative over-
sight committee would hear explanations and conflicting testimony in
a vocabulary largely unfamiliar to them and approve the rules adopted
by the agency. Perhaps some would herald this as an important develop-
ment because a group of men directly responsible to the people had a
part in the issuance of the rules. Whether this is more than presently
accomplished under the 1945 rule making act, with two elected officials
exercising the approval function, is subject to question.
There are still other matters pertinent to the latest reform proposal.
First, the General Assembly is in session for just sixty-one days in each
biennium and must of necessity delegate to a committee of its own
choosing the responsibility for reviewing administrative rules. But what
size group would adequately represent a General Assembly of 150 mem-
bers? Should the group consist largely or entirely of lawyers, or should
there be some effort to get a maximum degree of functional representa-
tion ? What geographic considerations must be taken into account, or is it
enough to have an equal division between legislators from rural and urban
areas? How much time would be necessary for this committee to operate
effectively and to achieve the stated purposes for which legislative over-
sight is established? To answer the last question some consideration must
be given to the matter of reviewing the hundreds of administrative rules
adopted, revised, amended and repealed in each year, and to the amount
of time necessary for hearings and searching Burns, session laws, and
supreme and appellate court reports. Finally, in view of the present
salaries of state legislators and the small per diem allowances to members
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of legislative advisory sub-committees, we may ask how much time the
legislators are willing to spend away from their law practices or businesses
in order to perform public services?
It is not enough for legislators to answer such questions by saying
that they are aware of rules of this or that agency which are unreasonable,
capricious, arbitrary, or contrary to legislative intent. A larger role for
the legislature in resolving whatever problems attend administrative
rule making in this state is certainly essential to promoting the principles
of the rule of law and administrative responsibility. However, a proposal
of this nature is unrealistic under the present arrangement. Lawmaking
is at most a part time activity, whereas administering laws is a full time
responsibility. The evidence suggests that further procedural changes,
whether legislative oversight or something else, are not necessary. Re-
sponsibility is not sacrificed to efficiency in a system where two elected
officials must give approval to administrative rules before they take
effect. Instead of trying to determine what new procedures may be de-
vised, the General Assembly should dedicate itself to the task of compelling
agencies to abide by those presently required, and it should make such
changes as are needed in each agency's organic acts to bring each one
under the provision of the uniform rule making law.
